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Abstract: The success of political liberalism depends on there being an overlapping 
consensus among reasonable citizens—including religious citizens—upon principles 
of political morality. This paper explores the resources within one major religion—
Christianity—that might lead individuals to endorse (or reject) political liberalism, 
and thus to join (or not join) the overlapping consensus. I show that there are several 
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One of the central questions that political liberalism seeks to address is: “how is it 
possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on religious authority, 
for example, the Church or the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception 
that supports a just democratic regime?”1 Or, in another formulation: “how is it pos-
sible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society who 
 
1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, exp. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. xxxvii. 
2 
endorse society’s intrinsic political ideals and values and do not simply acquiesce in 
the balance of political and social forces?”2 
A crucial part of the political liberal answer is the claim that there can be an overlap-
ping consensus among reasonable citizens—including reasonable religious citizens—
upon principles of political morality. Political liberals have done little to show that 
citizens holding particular religious doctrines could join this overlapping consensus, 
however. Many have sought to show that their view—and especially the requirements 
of public reason—does not place excessive burdens upon religious citizens. There is 
a large literature discussing whether public reason makes severe, unfair, identity-split-
ting, or integrity-compromising demands of the religious. Even if political liberalism 
is not excessively burdensome in these ways, however, this is insufficient to show 
that religious citizens have positive reasons to endorse the view, or lack strong rea-
sons to reject it, based upon their own comprehensive doctrines, as is required if an 
overlapping consensus is to obtain. Little attention has been paid to this further issue.  
This paper begins to address this lacuna, by considering resources within one major 
religion—Christianity—that might lead its adherents to endorse, or to reject, political 
liberalism. There is a rich tradition of theological reflection upon politics within 
Christianity, much of which considers similar questions to those that political liberal-
ism seeks to answer. I examine some of these materials here, in order to consider the 
prospects for a Christian justification of political liberalism. I do not provide a defin-
itive answer to the question of whether ‘all Christians’ should join the overlapping 
consensus. Given the variety within Christianity, such an answer is surely impossible. 
But I do identify several strands within Christian political ethics that are consonant 
with political liberalism, and might form the basis for Christian citizens’ membership 
of the overlapping consensus. I also show that certain apparent conflicts can be ad-
dressed. Nonetheless, tensions remain, and it is certainly not clear that Christians 
could give ‘wholehearted’ endorsement to a reasonable political conception, or unre-
served commitment to political liberal ideals. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First I explain the place of the overlapping consensus 
within political liberalism, in order to show how my question arises and why it 
 
2 Ibid., pp. 458-9. 
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matters, and offer some methodological notes and caveats with regard to my ap-
proach to theology. I then discuss a series of ideas within political theology. These 
include Christian understandings of the source of political authority, the role of gov-
ernment, and citizens’ freedom and equality. Throughout, I identify potential points 
of conflict, but also various ideas that are congruent with political liberalism. Indeed, 
I argue that Christians have strong reasons to endorse some version of liberalism, 
and some reasons to favour political liberalism in particular.3 However, I end with a 
final caution regarding this conclusion. 
 
Political Liberalism and the Overlapping Consensus 
Political liberalism seeks to show how there can “exist over time a just and stable 
society of free and equal citizens,”4 despite what John Rawls calls the ‘fact of reason-
able pluralism’. This is the fact that under liberal institutions individuals will come to 
affirm a great variety of incompatible ‘comprehensive doctrines’—religious, philo-
sophical, and moral doctrines that give an account of value and ideals of character 
and conduct across all domains of life. This fact creates a problem for liberals, who 
believe that citizens’ status as free and equal means that political institutions and or-
ganisation must be in some sense justifiable to each citizen.5 For political liberals, the 
consequence of reasonable pluralism is that the justification for political arrange-
ments cannot depend upon any particular comprehensive doctrine—“any particular 
ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical 
beliefs.”6 Instead, political justification must be made in terms of distinctively ‘politi-
cal’ principles and ideals that can be accepted by all reasonable citizens, whatever their 
 
3 Throughout, I use the term ‘political liberalism’ to refer to the kind of view associated with Rawls 
and his followers—what might otherwise be called ‘public reason liberalism’. I use the unqualified 
term ‘liberalism’ to refer to the wider family of views that prioritise individual freedoms, basic rights, 
the rule of law, democratic decision-making, and so on. Political liberalism is distinguished by its dis-
tinctive account of legitimacy. It is important to emphasise this point, since many theologians use the 
term ‘political liberalism’ to refer to what I am calling ‘liberalism’. 
4 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 4. 
5 The classic statement is Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 37(147) (1987): 127-150. See also Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2011), pp. 1-2. 
6 Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, p. 12. 
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comprehensive doctrine. This idea is expressed in Rawls’s ‘liberal principle of legiti-
macy’: “our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
them as reasonable and rational.”7 Rawls interprets this requirement as meaning that 
political justification must proceed in terms of public reasons, which are drawn from 
reasonable political conceptions of justice: “only a political conception of justice that 
all might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as the basis of public reason 
and justification.”8 Such conceptions are ‘political’ in three respects: “their principles 
apply to basic political and social institutions”; “they can be presented independently 
from comprehensive doctrines of any kind” (i.e. they are ‘freestanding’); and “they 
can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political 
culture of a constitutional regime, such as the conceptions of citizens as free and 
equal persons, and of society as a fair system of cooperation.”9 Political conceptions 
are ‘reasonable’ when they include what Jonathan Quong calls the ‘three general lib-
eral principles’:10 “first, a list of certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities (such 
as those familiar from constitutional regimes); second, an assignment of special pri-
ority to those rights, liberties, and opportunities…; and third, measures ensuring for 
all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms.”11 
Rawls hopes that all reasonable citizens can come to accept such a reasonable political 
conception of justice and to base their political advocacy upon it, thus fulfilling the 
‘duty of civility’ by providing public reasons for the policies that they support. Exer-
cises of political power will thereby be justified in ways that are acceptable to all, 
satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy and realising a just and stable society in 
the face of reasonable pluralism. 
On this picture, justice and stability are achieved by means of an ‘overlapping con-
sensus’. Citizens with a wide range of comprehensive doctrines all come to endorse 
a shared view of political morality, each from within their own broader worldview. 
 
7 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. 
8 Ibid., p. 137 
9 Ibid., p. 453. 
10 Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, p. 175. 
11 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 450. 
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Citizens do not simply acquiesce to the balance of political forces, or accept political 
liberalism for pragmatic reasons. Instead, each finds resources within their distinctive 
viewpoint that support the core ideas of political liberalism: the liberal principle of 
legitimacy, idea of public reason, reasonable political conceptions of justice, and so 
on.12 
The precise relationship between each citizen’s comprehensive doctrine and political 
conception can vary somewhat. Ideally, the former directly grounds the latter: citi-
zens’ comprehensive doctrines provide reason to hold that political arrangements 
should be justified using public reasons, such that they respect the limits imposed by 
the liberal principle of legitimacy due to “a balance of reasons as seen within each 
citizen’s comprehensive doctrine.”13 But individuals can be part of the overlapping 
consensus as long as their comprehensive doctrine does not conflict with political 
values—or, indeed, as long as such conflicts are not too common or severe, and are 
usually resolved in favour of the political conception.14 The key is that the overlapping 
consensus is not simply a compromise between people holding different views. It 
rests upon the totality of reasons specified within each comprehensive doctrine, 
which enable each individual to endorse political liberalism. This is what enables so-
ciety to be ‘stable for the right reasons’; that is, stably committed to a reasonable 
political conception even as the balance of political forces change, and this due to 
free, principled, endorsement rather than coercion or oppression. 
The success of political liberalism depends on whether an overlapping consensus can 
be realised. Yet political liberal theorists have said surprisingly little about this ques-
tion. Rawls sketches an account of how an overlapping consensus might develop, 
noting in particular that most individuals’ comprehensive views contain “a certain 
looseness”15 that enables them to be bent toward a political conception over time, 
given certain speculations about moral psychology. This is in effect a ‘just so’ story, 
 
12 There is some debate as to the precise subject of the overlapping consensus. See Quong, Liberalism 
Without Perfection, chapter 6. I think Rawls is clear that the overlapping consensus covers all of the 
fundamental ideas of political liberalism. For example, see Political Liberalism, p. 149. This debate does 
not much matter for my purposes here, since I focus on the compatibility of Christianity with the 
general political liberal approach to politics, and the view’s core underlying ideas. 
13 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 169. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 159. 
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offered to provide us with some reason to think that the idea of the overlapping 
consensus is not hopelessly utopian.16 Rawls goes on to comment on how several 
kinds of comprehensive doctrines can relate to political liberalism, showing that there 
are resources within various views that can support it. But there is no detailed argu-
mentation here, just some quick comments, such as that utilitarians might see a liberal 
political conception of justice as “a satisfactory, perhaps even the best, workable ap-
proximation to what the principle of utility… would require.”17 With regard to reli-
gious doctrines, Rawls notes that “all the main historical religions”18 admit of an ac-
count of free faith, which can “lead to a principle of toleration and underwrite the 
fundamental liberties of a constitutional regime.”19 While suggestive, this clearly falls 
short of providing an argument that the adherents of any particular religious tradition 
can endorse political liberal ideas. The claim that an overlapping consensus could 
exist remains a “hope,”20 or an “educated conjecture.”21 Much work remains to be 
done to explore whether this hope could be realised. Such work must proceed by 
examining the compatibility of specific comprehensive doctrines with political liber-
alism, and thus the possibility of their adherents joining the overlapping consensus. 
That is my project here, with regard to Christianity. 
Samuel Freeman calls the overlapping consensus “a hypothesis about the kinds of 
conceptions of the good that will be fostered by a well-ordered society.”22 The idea 
of a ‘well-ordered society’ introduces a complication we must note. Rawls’s well-or-
dered society is one whose political and social institutions are governed by a reason-
able political conception of justice, where all citizens endorse, and know that all other 
citizens endorse, that conception, and where citizens thus “generally comply with 
society’s basic institutions, which they regard as just.”23 Such a society will be stable 
if citizens’ endorsement of the political conception endures over time—i.e. if citizens 
 
16 Rawls introduces it as a response to the utopianism objection. Ibid., p. 158. 
17 Ibid., p. 170. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 145. 
20 Ibid., pp. 40, 270. 
21 Ibid., p. 15. 
22 Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 170. 
23 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 35. 
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growing up within the society develop comprehensive doctrines that support the po-
litical conception. Strictly, then, Rawls’s ‘overlapping consensus hypothesis’ concerns 
citizens who have grown up under just institutions. This means that we cannot simply 
read an answer to the question of whether adherents to any particular comprehensive 
doctrine such as Christianity can be part of the overlapping consensus from the level 
of support for political liberalism among Christians in the real world.24 Even if few 
current Christians are political liberals, perhaps a form of Christianity that supports 
it would develop within a well-ordered society. 
Nonetheless, it remains a relevant question whether citizens of the well-ordered so-
ciety could have recognisably Christian views. If the success of the overlapping con-
sensus within the well-ordered society was predicated on no citizens being Christians 
then this would be a problem for Rawls, since it would mean that such a society could 
only be achieved through the demise of one of the largest and most historically and 
culturally influential comprehensive doctrines within contemporary liberal demo-
cratic societies. This would cast serious doubt on political liberalism’s adequacy as a 
response to pluralism and credentials as a theory that shows how the exercise of po-
litical power can be justified to all citizens despite such pluralism, since it means that 
this achievement depends on radical departures from the kind of pluralism that we 
see in contemporary societies and that was (at least part of) the original motivation 
of the project. Even when the theory is framed in terms of the well-ordered society, 
therefore, it is still important to look at Christian political theology to see whether 
there are ideas within it that could plausibly lead Christians to be reasonable citizens 
of that society. The focus on the well-ordered society means that we are not simply 
measuring what proportion of current Christians endorse political liberalism, and that 
the overlapping consensus hypothesis is not falsified simply by finding that there are 
some strands of Christian theology that conflict with political liberalism. But the plau-
sibility of that hypothesis still depends on there being some supportive strands, which 
could plausibly form a case for the political conception within the well-ordered soci-
ety. 
 
24 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 346. 
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Before considering whether there are such strands, a few more preliminary comments 
are in order. 
First, the question of whether adherents to a particular comprehensive doctrine could 
endorse political liberalism arises for all such doctrines, but I focus exclusively on 
Christianity here. Christianity is the most numerically, historically, and culturally sig-
nificant religion within Western societies, and so it is an important test case for po-
litical liberalism. Further, there is a well-developed Christian political theology litera-
ture, which can form the basis for this inquiry—as well as some existing work on the 
(in)compatibility of Christianity with political liberalism. Clearly this does not imply 
that other religions—and non-religious comprehensive doctrines—are unimportant, 
or that there is not important work to be done examining the same questions in rela-
tion to those worldviews.25 
Of course, Christianity is very diverse, with disagreement both within and between 
the many Christian denominations. My aim is therefore not to show what ‘all Chris-
tians’ must believe about politics. Instead, I will explore various strands of Christian 
political thought, from a range of theological traditions.26 Many, although not all, of 
the theologians I engage with fall within the ‘Augustinian’ school of Christian political 
thought, due to this being particularly prominent within recent scholarship. Augus-
tinianism is itself broad, however, as we will see. 
Second, I am undertaking this inquiry as a political theorist, not as a theologian. My 
aim is to explore a question that arises within a particular political theory—political 
liberalism. The ideas of that theory thus constrain and shape the inquiry. This might 
make the discussion somewhat unsatisfactory to theologians. My analysis might seem 
 
25 There is some existing literature on political liberalism and Islam. See Andrew March, Islam and 
Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Abdullahi A. An-Na‘im, “Islamic Politics and the Neutral State: A Friendly Amendment to Rawls?” in 
Tom Bailey and Valentina Gentile (eds.), Rawls and Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2015): 242-265. There is also literature on political liberalism and feminism. See Amy Baehr, “Perfec-
tionism, Feminism and Public Reason,” Law and Philosophy 27(2) (2008): 193-222; Lori Watson and 
Christie Hartley, Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
26 One important theological concept that I do not discuss here is ‘natural law’, because I have exam-
ined the relationship between natural law and political liberalism in my “Public Reason and Religion: 
The Theo-Ethical Equilibrium Argument for Restraint,” Law and Philosophy 36(6) (2017): 675-705. 
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to be insufficiently deep, or to draw upon a mix of theological ideas that could be 
inconsistent at a deeper level. Certainly I do not develop a single coherent theological 
account. I believe that my approach fits my aims and has value, however, even if it 
also has drawbacks. 
Third, I focus on arguments made by academic theologians. This might raise con-
cerns about whether those arguments match the beliefs of ‘ordinary’ Christians. If 
there is significant divergence here, then the compatibility or otherwise of academic 
theology with political liberalism might tell us little about whether ordinary Christian 
citizens might endorse the view. Notwithstanding this concern, there are good rea-
sons to focus on academic arguments. Theologians have thought about these issues 
more deeply, and usually have a more developed moral and political philosophy inte-
grated with their theology. If we are to consider the best of Christian thinking then it 
is appropriate to turn to theologians’ views. Further, those views do have influence 
on the beliefs of ordinary Christians, often mediated through the teaching of priests 
and church leaders. Identifying strands of academic theology that can support politi-
cal liberalism would not be the same as showing that any particular Christian individ-
ual should do so. But it could suggest that political liberalism does not inherently 
conflict with the Christian faith, such that Christians could join the overlapping con-
sensus. 
Fourth, I will talk about ‘theological’ arguments, ideas, resources, etc., when referring 
to those involving explicitly theological concepts—God, Scripture, church teachings, 
religious beliefs, and so on. This does not imply that Christians cannot accept ‘non-
theological’ arguments or ideas. Indeed, as Nigel Biggar notes, some questions are 
purely ‘philosophical’, in the sense that theology does not contribute anything specific 
to answering them.27 Biggar argues that Christians should strive for theological integ-
rity, for the conformity of their moral and political beliefs with their theological ones. 
But integrity does not necessarily mean distinctiveness.28 As Richard Bayer puts it, “few 
Christians would interpret fidelity to their beliefs as a necessary rejection of all values 
 
27 Nigel Biggar, Behaving in Public: How to Do Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2011), 
pp. 10-11. Biggar’s example is “what makes it valid to distinguish an evil that is intentionally caused 
from one that is caused deliberately but unintentionally” (p. 11). 
28 Ibid., p. 8. 
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not explicitly theologically derived.”29 What Christians can and cannot accept in terms 
of political morality is shaped by theology. But it is not an insurmountable problem 
if there are no decisive solely theological arguments for political liberalism, or any 
particular reasonable political conception of justice. Any complete ‘Christian’ argu-
ment for political liberalism will undoubtedly combine ‘theological’ and ‘philosophi-
cal’ elements, so we should not imagine that all the work must be done by the former. 
The important question is therefore whether there are theological arguments that 
support (or oppose) the central ideas of political liberalism, and whether the theolog-
ically-warranted understanding of those ideas is compatible with political liberal in-
terpretations, such that Christians might be persuaded by philosophical arguments 
for why these ideas lead to political liberalism. 
Finally, I should acknowledge at the outset that many theologians, including most of 
those I mention below, in fact reject Rawlsian political liberalism. We will see some 
of the reasons for this below. But perhaps the most common reason is opposition to 
the idea of public reason “on the grounds that it severs many citizens’ deepest reli-
gious or moral commitments from their political deliberations and actions.”30 Oliver 
O’Donovan presents this objection forcefully. If people “are to achieve any moral or 
intellectual integrity, their political reflections must be coherent with the wider-rang-
ing trains of thought by which all human beings have to live.”31 Public reason, mean-
while, bypasses citizens’ moral traditions and identities, offering “us ‘reason’ as a pre-
determined quantity, ready sliced and ready packaged... It does not invite us to a dis-
cursive engagement as human thinkers with other human thinkers on matters of com-
mon concern.”32 As a result, public reason is “devoid of reasons that could lead us to 
act,”33 since its ‘reasons’ “do not derive from, or connect with, first-order reasons.”34 
 
29 Richard C. Bayer, “Christian Ethics and “A Theory of Justice”,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 64(1) (1996): 45-60, p. 53, fn. 6. 
30 Jonathan Chaplin, “Governing Diversity: “Public Judgment” and Religious Plurality,” in Robert 
Song and Brent Waters (eds.), The Authority of the Gospel (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2015): 122-
142, p. 122. 
31 Oliver O’Donovan, “Judgment, Tradition and Reason: A Response,” Political Theology 9(3) (2008): 
395-414, p. 409. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Oliver O’Donovan, ‘Reflections on Pluralism’, The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 29 (2008): 54-66, p. 57. 
34 Ibid., p. 58. 
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“My chief objection, then, to a religiously neutral ‘public reason,’ after the manner of 
Rawls, is that it is neither public nor reason.”35 
The idea of the overlapping consensus is meant to provide a response to exactly this 
objection. Political liberalism does not demand that one leave one’s comprehensive 
doctrine behind when entering the public realm, in order to appeal to a pool of rea-
sons that are disconnected from one’s fundamental beliefs. Instead, one should en-
dorse a political conception as coherent with, or even supported by, one’s compre-
hensive doctrine. Political conceptions achieve ‘full justification’ only when this is the 
case—only when they are accommodated within comprehensive doctrines.36 Political 
conceptions must be ‘freestanding’ in the sense of being capable of presentation inde-
pendently of any particular comprehensive doctrine, such that their normative force 
is not ineliminably dependent on any such doctrine But individual citizens should 
endorse such conceptions from within and on the basis of their comprehensive doctrines. 
Citizens should not split themselves into a public and private identity; they should 
have a unified identity that includes a desire to cooperate with others on terms all can 
accept, and thus an acceptance of the restrictions that this places on political advo-
cacy. In other words, Rawls agrees with O’Donovan that the rules governing public 
conduct must connect with citizens’ wider and deeper commitments, so that their 
moral identities can encompass both. Further, Rawls’s duty of civility permits citizens 
to present religious reasons within public deliberation at any time, subject to the pro-
viso that public reasons are offered “in due course”37—which I take to mean at the 
point that political power will actually be exercised, such as when citizens (justify 
their) vote. This requirement to ultimately present public reasons before political 
power is exercised is itself something that citizens should endorse from within their 
comprehensive doctrine, as members of the overlapping consensus. 
Of course, this Rawlsian story can succeed only if citizens can accept this view of 
political morality, given their various comprehensive doctrines. Christians can only 
join the overlapping consensus if their political theology is compatible with Rawls’s 
conception of fair terms of cooperation, the liberal principle of legitimacy, and the 
 
35 O’Donovan, “Judgment, Tradition,” p. 409. 
36 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 386-7. 
37 Ibid., p. 462. 
12 
idea of public reason. As David Hollenbach states, “if a secular understanding of the 
public role of religion makes demands that Christians cannot accept on their own 
terms, Christians will not be able to accept these demands.”38 O’Donovan would ar-
gue that political liberalism is incompatible with Christianity in precisely this way. But 
to explore this question we must consider theological materials, rather than short-
circuiting our inquiry by assuming that the kinds of political reasoning required by 
political liberalism simply must be incompatible with Christian thought because they 
are not directly derived from it and place certain constraints on religious reasons’ role 
within public justification. It is possible that a distinctly Christian politics aligns with 
political liberalism. But to find out, we must turn to theology. 
The rest of the paper is structured around themes in political theology, which I ex-
amine in order to explore the possible points of support for, and tension with, polit-
ical liberalism. At times this means the discussion will delve into theological debates, 
but the aim is always to relate these back to political liberalism. I structure the discus-
sion in this way, rather than structuring it around various political liberal commit-
ments, because I expect that most readers will be unfamiliar with the theological ma-
terial. I seek to build a picture of a Christian view of politics, to show the theological 
paths one might go down in order to ultimately accept or reject political liberalism. 
For this reason, I start with the question of the source of political authority, which 
both lays the ground for what follows, and highlights a fundamental objection that 
theologians often press against all forms of liberalism (albeit mistakenly, at least in 
the case of political liberalism, as I will argue). 
 
The Source of Political Authority 
Perhaps the most widely-discussed passage in the New Testament addressing Chris-
tians’ relationship to politics is Romans 13:1-7. Widely diverging interpretations of 
this passage have been offered, justifying a range of political positions.39 One thing 
that it clearly teaches, however, is that political authority is established by God: “Let 
 
38 David Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 114. 
39 Nick Spencer, Freedom and Order: History, Politics and The English Bible (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
2011) documents the range of interpretations of such passages over time. 
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every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except 
from God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God.”40 Rulers are 
commissioned by God to judge right from wrong and punish wrongdoers, thus es-
tablishing peace, order, security, and justice. They are “the servant of God to execute 
wrath on the wrongdoer.”41 God authorises governments to perform this task of 
judgment. 
An implication of this is that we do not have a choice about whether to live under 
political authority; it is a “providential gift.”42 Along with other aspects of the social 
order, it is “a gift to be received and appreciated,”43 rather than something arising 
from individuals’ unconstrained choice or created by human artifice. As Jonathan 
Chaplin writes (expounding O’Donovan), “the generative source of political author-
ity is divine action, and this excludes the idea that political representation amounts to 
any kind of popular authorization of the office of government itself.”44 
This does not mean that we have no choice regarding the forms of government that 
we live under or who holds political office; humans clearly design specific political 
forms, and the people’s recognition of leaders’ standing as their representatives is an 
important part of what authorises their rule.45 It also does not mean that God has 
directly appointed every political leader; as O’Donovan puts it, rulers being ‘God’s 
servant’ “does not imply a special intervention of the divine to appoint a particular 
ruler, but a general provision of non-reciprocal relations under which we may flour-
ish.”46 In both of these senses, political authority is still a “human institution,”47 in 
the apostle Peter’s words. Indeed, Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that Paul’s statement 
that “those authorities that exist have been instituted by God” does not mean “that 
whoever occupies some position of governmental authority does so because God has 
 
40 Romans 13:1. Unless otherwise stated, Biblical quotations are from the New Revised Standard Ver-
sion. 
41 Romans 13:4. 
42 Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgment (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 2005), p. 129. 
43 Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 279. 
44 Jonathan Chaplin, “Representing a People: Oliver O’Donovan on Democracy and Tradition,” Po-
litical Theology 9(3) (2008): 295-307, p. 297. 
45 See O’Donovan, Ways of Judgment, chapter 9. 
46 Ibid., p. 129. 
47 1 Peter 2:13. 
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put him in that position,” but that “whoever finds himself in such a position, however 
that came about, has a commission from God, an assignment, to serve God by exer-
cising governance over the public for the purpose of executing anger on wrongdo-
ing.”48 
Nonetheless, this providentialist view of political authority has led some to see liber-
alism as fundamentally flawed, because liberalism holds that individuals are the ulti-
mate source of political authority and governments have authority only due to citi-
zens’ consent.49 Modern liberalism is based “upon an illusory human subject who 
constructs order and denies transcendence,”50 on “the notion of the abstract will, 
exercising choice prior to all reason and order, from whose fiat lux spring society, 
morality and rationality itself.”51 Social contract theories have faced particularly fierce 
criticism. They seem to conflict with the view that “while the people can acknowledge 
and even control the legitimate use of political power, they neither create it nor alter 
its function. Its creation and purpose are already established by God.”52 
Political liberalism can evade this objection, however. Its central claim concerns the 
legitimacy of exercises of political power, rather than the generative source of political 
authority. There is no contradiction in holding both that governments must enact 
laws that fulfil the liberal principle of legitimacy and that God’s authorisation is the 
ultimate source of those governments’ authority and purpose. Indeed, many political 
liberals endorse the natural duty theory of political obligation, which has clear simi-
larities with providentialism. It holds that individuals have natural duties to act justly 
toward one another, which can only be fulfilled through the establishment of political 
institutions, with the authority to issue binding directives. Thus, in Rawls’s words, we 
have a duty “to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to 
 
48 Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Mighty and The Almighty: An Essay in Political Theology (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012), p. 95. 
49 For a helpful summary, see Elizabeth Phillips, Political Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: 
T&T Clark, 2012), chapter 6. 
50 Christopher J. Insole, The Politics of Human Frailty: A Theological Defence of Political Liberalism (London: 
SCM Press, 2004), p. 1. Insole defends liberalism against such assertions, which he attributes to theo-
logians such as O’Donovan, Robert Song, and John Milbank. 
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us.”53 We have obligations to obey this political authority whether or not we con-
sent(ed) to it. Society does not spring from individuals’ ‘abstract will’, but rests on 
unchosen obligations to realise justice. On this view, the origins of political authority 
lie in our natural duties of justice, while the liberal principle of legitimacy is one of 
the constraints that applies to such authorities, in the light of reasonable pluralism.54 
One could hold a structurally similar view involving providentialism: the origins of 
political authority lie in God’s authorisation, while exercises of political power are 
constrained by the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political liberalism therefore need 
not rest on the kind of account of political authorisation that theologians critique, 
and is compatible with providentialism. 
To be clear, this argument is only intended to show that political liberalism is not 
straightforwardly incompatible with providentialism. This in itself does not show that 
Christian theology contains elements that might actually support political liberalism. 
Further, one might suspect that those who embrace providentialism will, as a conse-
quence, hold a view concerning the legitimate exercise of political power that conflicts 
with the liberal principle of legitimacy.55 If political authority is a gift of God, then 
why tolerate those who do not believe in God or act sinfully? Or, at least, won’t a 
theological account of political authority lead to a principle of legitimacy whereby 
legitimate laws must directly express God’s will, promote piety, and deter sin? The 
following sections seek to show that this need be the case. Providentialists can be 
liberals, and Christians have strong theological reasons to support liberalism, which 
could also lend support to political liberalism. The next section makes this argument 
by examining a second key theme of Christian political theology: the ‘descralisation 
of politics’. 
 
The Desacralisation of Politics 
As well as authorising governments, Romans 13 also teaches that political authorities 
are subject to God. They are his servants,56 accountable to his will. They ought to act 
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only within the domains, and for the purposes, that God has authorised—within their 
specific God-given role. This idea is also reflected in Jesus’ response when asked 
whether faithful Jews should pay taxes to the emperor. Having established that Ro-
man coins displayed Caesar’s image, Jesus tells his audience to “Render to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar’s.”57 Political authorities make legitimate demands upon us, 
which we should willingly obey. But Jesus adds: “and [render] to God the things that 
are God’s.”58 Some things are owed to God, not to Caesar. Indeed, if coins should 
be given back to Caesar due to bearing his image, then as God’s image-bearers hu-
mans owe themselves back to God. God is the one who merits humans’ complete alle-
giance and ultimate loyalty. Political authorities do not. They cannot define individu-
als’ most important or fundamental identities. Political identities are always secondary 
and relativised by the Christian gospel. Further, what can be achieved through politics 
is importantly limited. Politics has no salvific power. It achieves only penultimate 
goods, by issuing penultimate judgments. It cannot establish the kingdom of God. 
This is what is meant by the desacralisation of politics. Political communities cannot 
be vehicles of salvation or places where the kingdom of God is realised. As David 
Fergusson puts it, “the kingdom of God is ultimately an eschatological reality not to 
be confused with any penultimate political state.”59 The pervasive effects of sin, the 
difficulty and ambiguity of all human moral judgment in a fallen world, and the state’s 
constant tendency to seek to take the place of God and demand undue levels of loy-
alty, all place severe constraints on the power that political authorities ought to exer-
cise and what can be achieved through such power. This does not mean that politics 
is divorced from morality or that states cannot realise greater or lesser degrees of 
justice. Christians can still “work for the transformation of social life into a more 
fitting reflection of the good that is their ultimate hope,”60 in Hollenbach’s words. 
But they do so while recognising the inherent limits of politics. They are “required by 
their faith to reject any attempt to achieve the full common good, as it is understood 
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theologically, by political means.”61 As Eric Gregory states, “earthly politics cannot 
fulfill the deepest longings of a human person or community.”62 
This idea of desacralisation is further supported by considering the nature and role 
of the church—the alternative polis of believers in Jesus, membership of which is 
based on faith rather than place of birth, national identity, or political citizenship. The 
church is always distinct from society or state, and it has been entrusted with the task 
of preaching the gospel of Jesus and his kingdom. Membership in Christ replaces all 
other political identities, such that the state cannot “act as a focus of collective iden-
tity.”63 Gregory writes that ‘Augustinian liberals’ “for theological reasons, … neither 
expect nor want the state to become a confessing religious community.”64 Even while 
they hope for as many individuals as possible to confess faith in Christ, they recognise 
that church and society will never be identical.65 As Nick Spencer puts it, “it is the 
word, rather than the sword, which is to be deployed in determining religious loyal-
ties.”66 Indeed, Wolterstorff highlights the fact that the existence of the church always 
creates pluralism and religious fissure. As a result of the presence of the church, “the 
state cannot express the shared religious identity of the people, since there is no such 
identity.”67 This age will always be a ‘mixed age’, where those who are and are not 
members of God’s people live together within society. The Christian understanding 
of ‘the secular’ is that it is constitutes this age or time, the saeculum: “a shared time 
afforded all humanity by the common grace of God,”68 as Gregory explains. This is 
a time where good can be done, and political authorities have a legitimate God-given 
role to play. But that role is always limited, and always relativised by Christians’ “ulti-
mate loyalty to a community beyond the state”69 and hope of a future, eschatological, 
age where full justice and goodness will be realised, when Christ returns. “The 
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‘secular’ refers simply to that mixed time when no single religious vision can presume 
to command comprehensive, confessional, and visible authority.”70 
As should be clear, these ideas form the basis for a strong theological defence of 
liberalism, as the political theory that consciously seeks to limit state action, rejects 
attempts to impose any single comprehensive doctrine upon citizens, and protects 
the freedom of religious institutions. Liberalism resists the tendency for citizens’ good 
to be identified with the good of the political community, or for their political iden-
tities to be seen as fundamental or ultimate. It recognises that citizens have a life 
beyond the purview of state power, and permits them to pursue and prioritise reli-
gious and other comprehensive commitments. As Charles Mathewes notes, “what 
liberalism fears is precisely the absolutization and theologization of the state.”71 Lib-
eralism follows Christianity in desacralising politics. Christians thus have strong rea-
sons to endorse liberalism. 
These ideas could also be used to support political liberalism. A central political liberal 
tenet is that in the light of pluralism citizens should not seek to enforce their under-
standing of the good through politics, but should instead cooperate with others on 
the basis of reasons acceptable to all. One might argue that this is what Christian 
political conduct in the saeculum involves. As we will see later, some theologians do 
make this move. 
We should not be too quick here, however. Desacralisation is associated with a rejec-
tion of ‘coercive salvationist’ policies—i.e. enforcing specific religious practices—and 
‘comprehensive perfectionist’ policies—i.e. seeking to make people fully virtuous. 
But rejecting these kinds of policies is not the same as rejecting all religiously-
grounded political advocacy or endorsing the need for a distinctively political con-
ception of justice. As Andrew Lister notes, “not just any decision made on the basis 
of a religious reason involves the attempt to shift the distribution of belief in favour 
of this reason. Policies motivated by religious reasons may simply aim at what is right, 
in the eyes of those with the views in question.”72 A defence of liberalism, with its set 
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of basic rights and liberties, including freedom of religion, should not be conflated 
with a defence of political liberalism, with its distinctive claims about justice, stability, 
and legitimacy.73 
Gregory explicitly makes this point. He joins Rawls in rejecting a perfectionism that 
tries to maximise the achievement of human excellence. Indeed, he “reject[s] the ac-
tual possibility of moral perfection in this life.”74 But this does “not require rejecting 
a perfectionist ethics that calls citizens to aspire to a better quality of political loving 
in relation to a transcendent good.”75 It does not mean rejecting all policies that seek 
to promote virtue or flourishing, or that discourage practices that diminish it, such as 
those associated with moderate forms of liberal perfectionism.76 In other words, it 
does not require accepting the need for laws to be justified by public reasons. 
This is not to say that Christians should hold this kind of view, or to deny that the 
ideas explored in this section take us some way toward a theological case for political 
liberalism. But to complete that case we would need to know more about what polit-
ical authorities are authorised to do. We have seen that Romans 13 both authorises 
and limits governments; political authorities’ status as “God’s servants” both legiti-
mises their function and constrains their reach. But we need to look further at what 
this constraint involves.77 
 
The Role of Government 
Here we encounter a central debate in Christian political theology, between those 
who hold that governments have a primarily negative role, in restraining evil and 
preventing injustices, and those who hold that they have a more positive role, in pro-
moting virtue or the common good. On the former view, a consequence of the fact 
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that politics “is not a vehicle for building the kingdom of God on earth” is that “it 
can be nothing more than a remedial structure for securing some modicum of peace 
and relative justice in a fallen world.”78 According to the latter, the desacralisation of 
politics is compatible with the state actively promoting citizens’ flourishing, or ori-
enting them toward the good. This section will sketch some of the contours of this 
debate, in order to explore how it maps onto possible support for, or rejection of, 
political liberalism. 
Wolterstorff offers an important recent statement of the former view, which builds 
on Paul’s statement that the government is “is the servant of God to execute wrath 
on the wrongdoer”79 and Peter’s similar claim that it is “sent by [God] to punish those 
who do wrong.”80 For Wolterstorff, this shows that “the God-assigned task of gov-
ernment is to exercise governance over the public for the purpose of curbing wrong-
doing,”81 which he understands as rights-violations, by deterring and publishing it. 
Wolterstorff draws two implications from this. First, given their task to curb wrong-
doing, governments must not become wrongdoers themselves. They are not author-
ised to perform wrongful actions, so must be rights-honouring and rights-limited. 
“The authority of the state is limited by the rights of the members of the public.”82 
States that perpetuate injustice act outside their legitimate authority, issuing directives 
they are not morally permitted to issue, and which thus do not obligate obedience. 
Second, Paul does not say that the state’s role is to provide a good life for all or 
promote citizens’ virtue. “The God-given task of government is not to pressure citi-
zens into becoming virtuous and pious; its God-given task is instead to pressure citi-
zens into not perpetrating injustice.”83 “God authorises and enjoins the state to be a 
rights-protecting institution,”84 not a virtue-promoting one.85 Another social institu-
tion has the role of enabling people to live good, God-pleasing lives—the church. 
This further means that the institutional autonomy of the church, and religious 
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freedom of individual believers, must be protected.86 In sum, the state is “limited in 
exactly the sort of way that our liberal democracies are limited.”87 
The is a powerful theological argument for liberal democracy, anti-perfectionism, and 
the primacy of justice within our account of legitimate government action. Christians 
who hold this view of the role of government might well be sympathetic to political 
liberalism. Strikingly, however, this is not true of Wolterstorff. Indeed, he is a prom-
inent and persistent critic of political liberalism. He argues that the search for reasons 
acceptable to all reasonable citizens is doomed to failure, unless we idealise this justi-
ficatory constituency in radical ways, which contradicts the original motivation of 
seeking justification to all.88 And he rejects the Rawlsian duty of civility as imposing 
undue burdens on citizens’ integrity.89 Citizens should be permitted to deliberate and 
vote on the basis of their religious and other comprehensive beliefs, which can 
properly inform their views of justice. In other words, there is no need for state action 
to be justified using conceptions of justice that are ‘political’ in Rawls’s sense. The 
state is limited to curbing injustice, but the conceptions of justice on which it acts 
need not be freestanding from comprehensive doctrines. Notably, however, these 
objections to political liberalism are more philosophical than theological. They chal-
lenge the philosophical coherence and normative attractiveness of the view, without 
drawing directly on theological resources.90 Wolterstorff’s explicitly theological 
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account of political morality is certainly amenable to political liberalism. Christians 
who endorse that account might thus find reason to endorse political liberalism.91 
Theologians who endorse a more expansive, virtue-promoting, role for the state 
would challenge Wolterstorff’s identification of wrongdoing with rights-violations, 
noting that Paul does not explicitly delimit wrongdoing in this way. A more capacious 
view of wrongdoing makes room for a more ambitious political practice, such as 
Gregory’s moderate perfectionism. Gregory grounds his view in an Augustinian 
moral psychology of love. Following Paul Ramsey, Gregory holds that it is Christian 
love that both provides a justification for the exercise of coercive political power and 
accounts for the limits that ought to be placed on such use of force.92 Humans “are 
best understood in terms of the loves they embody and express,”93 and politics has a 
role in shaping and directing those loves. “True virtue is a matter of loving well and 
loving freely. Justice is about getting our loves arranged in the appropriate manner, 
giving and receiving love in the right sorts of ways.”94 The wrongdoing that the state 
can address thus goes beyond merely preventing violations of others’ rights. Gregory 
stresses that he is concerned with “a love appropriate to political citizenship in a lib-
eral culture.”95 This means resisting paternalist moralism and coercive perfectionism, 
and maintaining the Augustinian emphasis on the limits of what politics can achieve 
in the light of sin. Nonetheless, he develops “a morally ambitious ethics of citizen-
ship”96 based on an account of neighbour-love, which “is not focused solely on justice 
as fairness”97 but is concerned with addressing “social conditions that frustrate hu-
man flourishing.”98 This love-informed conception of the just society clearly goes 
beyond the ‘political’, both in terms of the duties it places upon citizens and in vio-
lating the freestandingness condition. It also supports (non-coercive) perfectionist 
policies that cannot be justified within the bounds of public reason. Gregory’s view 
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is thus a clear example of an account of the role of government that conflicts with 
political liberalism. 
Another prominent theme within the more positive view of the role of government, 
especially within the Catholic tradition, is the ‘common good’. The central idea here 
is that individual well-being depends upon social relationships and goods that can 
only be achieved in common. Political life should promote the common good, by 
both facilitating the provision of communal goods and encouraging a sense of soli-
darity and interdependence that causes citizens to value, and play their part within, 
the common good. Hollenbach develops an account of contributive and distributive 
justice grounded in such an ideal: all have a duty to contribute to the provision of 
basic goods that all require (e.g. housing, jobs, education), and some goods should be 
equally available to all (e.g. healthcare) while others can be distributed in relation to 
productivity.99 This account reflects the United States Catholic Bishop’s statement 
that “basic justice demands the establishment of minimum levels of participation in 
the life of the human community for all persons.”100 
Common-good-based accounts of politics might seem likely to be perfectionist, and 
thus another site of conflict with political liberalism. This is certainly true of some. 
Yet Rawls lists “Catholic views of the common good and solidarity” as potential 
members of the family of reasonable political conceptions of justice, “when they are 
expressed in terms of political values.”101 Hollenbach’s example supports this. His 
ideals of solidarity and the common good are informed by his theology, but are de-
fined in a non-comprehensive way that plausibly means that they fall within public 
reason, especially since he consistently emphasises the importance of individual free-
dom within—and as a contributor to—the common good. He seeks to “develop an 
understanding of the common good of a pluralist society,”102 “the common good of 
a community of freedom.”103 Indeed, he explicitly endorses Rawls’s proviso as a re-
quirement of reciprocal respect, while also noting that we should expect religious 
visions of the common good to shape our societal understanding of what counts as 
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politically reasonable, and thus our conception of public reason.104 Some political lib-
erals might be uncomfortable with this idea. Rawls seemed open to it,105 however, 
and such openness is undoubtedly a prerequisite for Christian endorsement of polit-
ical liberalism. 
An interesting implication of this discussion is that the theological debate concerning 
the role of governments cuts across the debate concerning political liberalism, rather 
than straightforwardly mapping onto it. While views that limits government to re-
straining evil and securing justice are certainly amenable to political liberalism, some 
who endorse such views nonetheless reject political liberalism, opposing the re-
strictions that it places upon religious reasons within political deliberation and deci-
sion-making. Meanwhile, Christian perfectionist views like Gregory’s conflict with 
political liberalism, but other more positive views of the role of government, such as 
Hollenbach’s, adopt an account of the common good that can fit within a political 
conception of justice. Part of the reason that this is possible is that Rawlsians have a 
capacious view of justice, which enables various ideals within the Christian tradition 
to find ‘political analogues’ that can be included within public reason. This might raise 
a concern that the overlap between views like Hollenbach’s and political liberalism is 
merely coincidental, and not the basis for stable endorsement of the kind required 
for membership in the overlapping consensus. Two responses are possible. First, 
even accidental overlap might be enough for such membership, since it at least means 
that one’s comprehensive doctrine does not (frequently) conflict with political liberal 
duties. Second, the consonance between Hollenbach’s view and political liberalism, 
at least, runs deeper than this. He is explicitly concerned with “the task of forming 
and sustaining a society in which people from diverse religious and cultural traditions 
can live well together”106 and values freedom, equality, respect, and reciprocity. 
In sum, Christians who hold both a more limited and more positive view of the role 
of government might find reason to endorse political liberalism. There are thus sev-
eral paths by which Christians could join the overlapping consensus; but there are 
also prominent political theologies that make this impossible. 
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Citizens as Free and Equal 
Thus far I have focused on theological views of the role of politics and government. 
But we might also ask about the Christian view of persons, and whether it supports 
the central political liberal ideal of citizens as free and equal. At first glance, the answer 
to this seems clearly positive. Christians have strong reasons to endorse ideas of hu-
man freedom and equality. Humans have a dignity and worth bestowed upon them 
by God, as creatures made in the image of their creator and loved by him. They also 
have a shared vulnerability and complicity in sin. Theologians have drawn on these 
ideas in various ways to generate support for familiar liberal freedoms. 
For example, Dignitatis Humanae, the Declaration of Religious Freedom issued by the 
Second Vatican Council, proclaims a “right of the human person to religious free-
dom” that “has its foundations in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity 
is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.”107 Our dignity 
means that we are “endowed with reason and free will,” so bear personal responsi-
bility for discerning and acting upon truth. We are obligated to seek after truth, but 
can only do so in a way that is in keeping with our nature if we are free from coercion 
in religious matters. 
Wolterstorff defends liberal rights based on the great evil of violating a person, which 
fails to acknowledge their dignity.108 A person’s normative identity is tied up with her 
physical body, inner life, deeply held religious and moral convictions, and cares, con-
cerns, and attachments—her deep investment in the world.109 Violations of any of 
these things violate the person. Christians should support liberal rights due to the way 
they protect people from such violations.110 Robert Adams makes a similar argument: 
“The distinguishing mark of the freedoms that most deserve protection is that they 
are most closely connected with our personhood and the significance of our lives, so 
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that it is more plausible to say that something sacred has been violated if coercion 
denies them to us.”111 
Christopher Insole places more emphasis on human frailty, arguing that an apprecia-
tion of our creatureliness leads to political moderation. The fallen nature of humanity 
and the world means that truths about justice and goodness are often difficult to 
discern. The natural moral order is obscured, and we should recognise our limitations 
in apprehending it. There are clear affinities with Rawls’s notion of the burdens of 
judgment here.112 Our epistemic limitations, combined with a God-given impulse to 
strive for meaning and purpose, should lead us to expect a diversity of comprehensive 
doctrines—without thereby positively valuing this outcome, or seeing all such doc-
trines as providing a true perception of reality.113 The political implication of this, for 
Insole, is an aversion to coercion, and particularly to coercion that imposes one’s 
conception of the good on others. Such coercion “tramples upon the frailty and vul-
nerability of our shared human condition, all of us complicit in sin, and dependent 
upon the grace of God.”114 “From a sense of humility and fellowship in sin, we are 
called to show love to our neighbour by exemplifying self-restraint, self-examination 
and charity.”115 
While both Wolterstorff and Insole thus endorse liberalism and reject coercive per-
fectionism, they part ways in their evaluations of political liberalism. Insole explicitly 
endorses Rawls’s claim that reciprocity requires that laws be justified by reasons that 
all citizens can be expected to accept. Laws cannot permissibly be justified by sole 
appeal to “distinctively and irreducibly religious reasons, reasons that arise from a 
special authority supposed to derive from scripture, a particular tradition or inspira-
tion, and which cannot be assented to by someone who does not assent to this 
 
111 Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 328. 
112 As noted by Insole, Politics of Human Frailty, pp. 47-48; Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, pp. 66-
67. 
113 See Chaplin, “Governing Diversity,” pp. 126-129. 
114 Insole, Politics of Human Frailty, p. 63. 
115 Ibid. For another argument focused on human limitations, in particular on our susceptibility to 
pride, see Paul Weithman, “Toward an Augustinian Liberalism,” Faith and Philosophy 8(4) (1991): 461-
480. 
27 
authority.”116 One might plausibly argue that such a conclusion also follows from 
Wolterstorff’s account, because subjection to laws that cannot be justified to an indi-
vidual by reasons that she accepts violates her personhood. Wolterstorff rejects this, 
however. In his view, one’s personhood is respected as long as basic civil liberties are 
protected and laws are enacted through deliberative democratic procedures. Only co-
ercion that constrains deep commitments or attachments, such as denials of religious 
liberty, violates persons. Basic rights prevent this kind of coercion; no further reason-
based conditions on legitimacy are necessary. Thus, while the Christian view of hu-
man freedom and equality can be interpreted in ways that support political liberalism, 
not all theologians accept that interpretation. 
Indeed, Christians might have theological reasons to be suspicious of the political 
liberal understanding of freedom and equality, given its connection to ideas of auton-
omy. Political liberalism is not grounded in any ‘ethical’ notion of autonomy, which 
values individual reflection, considered choosing, and an attitude of revisability in 
relation to all of one’s commitments as a central feature of the good life. But political 
liberalism is concerned with political autonomy. This is realised in our capacity as citi-
zens when we enjoy the rights and resources that enable us to be equal participants 
in political decision-making and when we act from principles that we would give to 
ourselves, which requires that political decisions are justified using reasons we find 
acceptable.117 This political autonomy is central to the Rawlsian notion of citizens as 
free and equal.118 It means that citizens are able to see political demands as self-im-
posed, thus enabling reconciliation with that subjection.119 But, as Weithman notes, 
“the question of why autonomy is valuable has to be addressed from within different 
conceptions of the good.”120 And there might be reason to doubt that a Christian 
conception of freedom and equality can include political autonomy. 
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To see why, consider O’Donovan’s conception of freedom. He writes: 
“We discover we are free when we are commanded by that authority which 
commands us according to the law of our being, disclosing the secrets of the 
heart. There is no freedom except when what we are, and do, corresponds to 
what has been given us to be and to do. ‘Given to us’, because the law of our 
being does not assert itself spontaneously merely by virtue of our existing. We 
must receive ourselves from outside ourselves, addressed by a summons which 
evokes that correspondence of existence to being.”121 
Freedom consists in living in accordance with the given moral order, the ‘law of our 
being’ that has been established independently of us, by one who is outside of us—
God. “Moral freedom can never be established on a basis of self-sufficiency and in-
dependence from the world.”122 “Our freedom as agents depends upon our acting in 
accord with reality.”123 In other words, there is no value in acting on principles that 
one would give to oneself, if those principles do not accord with the God-given moral 
reality. This is not to imply that there is a single blueprint for how the basic structure 
of all societies should be arranged. O’Donovan recognises the role of human deci-
sion-making in shaping the specific form that political and social institutions take. 
But here he strikes a distinctively communitarian note: societies have particular his-
torical ways of existing, traditions, which constitute ongoing modes of functioning 
that define the common good of the collective.124 Individuals find freedom through 
participation in communications and cultural practices within a community whose 
traditions they identify with. “Freedom is the self-realisation of the individual within 
social forms.”125 “Social identity, then, is an important contributing element in the 
freedom of an individual.”126 Of course, a society’s way of life is not an ultimate good 
in itself; it must be appropriately related to moral truth. This gives room for 
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individuals to challenge society’s traditions. But they must do so by the standards of 
the God-given order, if this challenge is to promote freedom.127 
In the light of this, O’Donovan sees the role of political authorities as being judging 
wrongs, in order to defend the common good, which is defined by God’s revealed 
moral truth, as mediated by a people’s particular traditions.128 It is through issuing 
such judgments that political authorities secure citizens’ freedom. Citizens’ obligation 
to comply is grounded in political authorities fulfilling this God-given role. Such ob-
ligation is not the same as compulsion: “to do something one is obliged to… is to do 
it freely, not under compulsion.”129 The obligation is “laid upon us by the author-
ity,”130 but compliance should still be a free action, and “to oblige us freely to do 
something, authority must present us with a reason for doing it.”131 In the words of 
Romans 13:5, we should obey “because of conscience.” But this does not mean that 
governments must give conspicuous and clear reasons for every dictate, much less 
reasons that all citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. We often rely on au-
thorities to show us the reasons for acting, and usually a general recognition that the 
government is serving the common good by protecting society against wrongs is suf-
ficient for citizens to act freely in fulfilling their political obligation. O’Donovan 
therefore unambiguously rejects the liberal principle of legitimacy. 
I have offered a very condensed sketch of aspects of O’Donovan’s complex account 
of freedom, political authority, and their relationship, to show how it conflicts with 
political liberalism. We should be clear that O’Donovan is not a straightforward per-
fectionist: he does not believe that governments should promote citizens’ virtue or 
encourage individual piety.132 Further, various critical questions can be pressed against 
O’Donovan’s view, especially with regard to its compatibility with pluralism.133 Ac-
commodating disagreement concerning the right and the good undoubtedly puts 
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pressure on the connection between true freedom and political authority, since it 
means that a society’s traditions and common good must be defined rather loosely, 
so that they do not require much moral agreement.134 But the key point for our pur-
poses is that his understanding of freedom means that he would place little value on 
Rawlsian political autonomy, and leads him to reject political liberal claims about le-
gitimacy. 
I have focused on O’Donovan’s view here since it is particularly well-developed and 
influential. The general lesson is that Christians might well conceive of freedom as 
involving conformity with God’s will. In order to nonetheless endorse political liber-
alism, they must hold that this conception of freedom should not be determinative 
in structuring political life, and that Rawls’s conception of political autonomy does 
have value within its limited domain of application. One might draw on various the-
ological resources that we have already encountered in order to make this kind of 
argument: the limits of what can be achieved through political power; individual crea-
tureliness, with its dual components of dignity and fragility; sin’s distortion of moral 
perception. Such an argument can also draw on the fact that what political autonomy 
ultimately requires on Rawls’s view is regulation by a reasonable political conception 
of justice—one that includes the three general liberal principles.135 Christians have 
strong theological reasons to endorse those principles.136 
Even then, however, Christians attracted to something like O’Donovan’s view will 
struggle to endorse what Weithman calls the ‘regulation condition’ for political au-
tonomy: “Citizens treat the fundamental terms of their association as regulative in 
practical deliberation, and they take the authority of those terms to be justified by the 
fact that the terms would be collectively self-legislated.”137 The fact of idealised col-
lective self-legislation will not have this normative role. Nonetheless, given the actual 
content of reasonable political conceptions of justice, and thus of the fundamental 
terms of association in a political liberal society, such Christians perhaps could still 
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endorse such a conception. They might even view such a conception as having a 
sufficient connection to moral reality and the community traditions of a liberal dem-
ocratic society that a basic structure regulated by it does enable freedom. Even if 
political autonomy does not have the independent value that it does for Rawls, there 
might be a contingent alignment here that enables such Christians to be members of 
the overlapping consensus. If so, then one of the deepest barriers to such member-
ship might be overcome. 
 
Final Cautions 
I have noted some points of tension, and even conflict, between Christian political 
theology and political liberalism, but also identified various areas of agreement and 
possible paths to endorsement. It is quite possible that the former could be overcome 
and the latter developed in order to generate support for political liberalism. Even 
then, however, Christian theology will always strike a note of caution. Even liberal 
states, and even political liberalism, contain what Mathewes calls “the inevitable ten-
dency to make our political identity our essential, existential identity,” which “Chris-
tianity always condemns as idolatrous.”138 There will always be tensions between 
faithful Christianity and any particular political theory or programme, because the 
distorting effects of sin and ambiguities of moral judgment are abiding features of life 
in this age. Christians are always wary of “false pseudo-resolutions”139 that seek to 
manufacture a complete harmonisation of loyalties, identities, and commitments. The 
church acts as a standing rebuke to the state’s ever-present temptation to offer a 
complete community. Christian faith thus “renders commitment to our common re-
public complicatedly ambivalent.”140 James Smith uses similar language: Christian the-
ology “encourage[s] a certain kind of holy ambivalence about our relationship to the 
political, a sort of engaged but healthy distance rooted in our specifically eschatolog-
ical hope.”141 As does Gregory: “Christian political theology, given concerns for 
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idolatry, does not seek permanent coalitions with particular political arrangements or 
theories.”142 Christians cannot ‘baptise’ Rawls—or any other political theory. 
Mathewes emphasises that this is a good thing, which keeps politics honest and stops 
the state from claiming total allegiance. However, as Patrick Neal highlights, it also 
seems to conflict with Rawls’s hope that citizens will be ‘wholehearted’ members of 
the well-ordered society. While they might be able to endorse political liberalism, they 
cannot “profess ‘wholehearted’ allegiance to any political regime, or any set of prin-
ciples specifying a political regime.”143 Their commitment will always be qualified and 
hedged. Neal adds, however, that in his view no other political theory can do better 
in this regard. “Political liberalism is not bad as a theory of the just political state; but 
it’s still just a theory of the political state. One’s deepest duties lie elsewhere.”144 
Perhaps Rawlsians can accept this limitation on Christians’ commitment. Rawls’s no-
tion of ‘wholehearted’ membership might not imply an unrevisable or uncritical alle-
giance that would contradict the provisionality that I have highlighted. Nonetheless, 
this does complicate our picture of membership of the overlapping consensus and 
limit the kind of authority or priority that Christians can ultimately give to political 
values. There is a sense in which Christian citizens must always keep their distance 
from any political theory or regime, resisting the temptation to “reinterpret Christi-
anity in terms of a dominant secular discourse of our day.”145 No political regime in 
this age is ‘final’ or achieves complete justice; Christian politics is always the politics 
of imperfectability. 
This also points to another remaining concern with political liberalism: that it ulti-
mately demands too much agreement upon political values and ideals. Even taking 
into account the possibility for reasonable disagreement about the interpretation and 
weighing of political values, and thus the range of reasonable political conceptions of 
justice, the domain of the ‘reasonable’ is still significantly limited, such that citizens 
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are expected to exhibit fairly high levels of agreement regarding which reasons satisfy 
the liberal principle of legitimacy. Many critics have questioned the viability of the 
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘non-public’ reasons.146 But even if it is viable, the 
idea that all reasonable citizens could perceive and agree upon this distinction might 
be too idealistic for Christians to accept, in the light of their doctrine of sin and es-
chatology. The peace and justice achieved by human societies are always more partial, 
fragile, and limited than Rawls’s well-ordered society, with its stability for the right 
reasons. This is what motivates Jeffrey Stout to label Rawls’s view a ‘poor man’s 
communitarianism’,147 and Wolterstorff to claim that it is “still looking for a politics 
that is the politics of a community with a shared perspective,”148 which pluralism 
makes impossible. The Christian view might be less optimistic and more agonistic. It 
might look more like what I have elsewhere called an ‘argumentative democracy’—a 
view that I attribute to Wolterstorff.149 
For example, Biggar argues that the nature of the agreement that Christians should 
expect to find with non-believers “is not Rawlsian, but Augustinian. It is not whole 
and stable, but partial and provisional.” It is always “an imperfect compromise, sub-
ject to criticism.”150 Part of Biggar’s point here might be compatible with political 
liberalism: citizens will have comprehensive views that go beyond the subject of the 
overlapping consensus and sometimes conflict with it, and even within the overlap-
ping consensus their interpretation and weighing of political values might be shaped 
by their comprehensive doctrines.151 But Biggar is also arguing that any overlapping 
consensus will itself be incomplete, and unable to contain all relevant political disa-
greements. While citizens should appeal to shared ideals and public reasons where 
they can, not all political debate or decision-making will be able to occur within that 
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currency. In a similar vein, Michael Lamb has recently argued that Augustine’s posi-
tion is more resonant with Cass Sunstein’s ‘incompletely theorised agreements’ than 
Rawls’s overlapping consensus.152 
This brings us back to the central objection to political liberalism that I mentioned 
near the start: that political liberalism “severs many citizens’ deepest religious or 
moral commitments from their political deliberations and actions.”153 I noted that the 
overlapping consensus provided a solution to this. But this solution might depend on 
a degree of optimism about how much political agreement can be achieved, and a 
level of commitment to the settled nature of that agreement, which itself cannot be 
accepted by Christians. Perhaps this kind of provisionality and ambivalence is still 
compatible with membership in the overlapping consensus, as long as one does en-
dorse a reasonable political conception of justice. But if it is not, then it seems that 
accepting a Rawlsian political morality might require Christians to place more faith in 
politics than is theologically warranted, such that political liberalism can indeed only 
succeed by severing Christians’ deepest commitments from their political under-
standing. Ironically, then, it might be that the biggest obstacle to Christian member-
ship of the overlapping consensus is precisely the level of faith that Rawls’s view de-
mands.154 
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